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Summary findings
Somc propose  that the Baltics seek deeper trade  *  Numerous  nontariff  barriers with the East, slow and
integration  with the East to maintain existing trade flows  unreliablc  payments, unstable  currencies, and barter
and because the Baltics have had  little market access to  arrangements  increase transaction  costs and impede  the
the West.  creation  of more trade.
Sorsa argues against such integration,  proposing  - Preferential  trading with Russia or Ukraine entails
instead that the Baltics improve  trade relations  with the  the risk of increasing external  protection  for the more
West, where  market  access is likely to be less and  less of  liberal Baltics. This risk is magnified by the  relatively
a problem.  slow adjustment  of Russia and  other  former Soviet Union
After assessing factor  endowments,  and using a gravity  republics and  the faster reform  in the Baltics.
model, Sorsa predicts that more than  90 percent  of Baltic  The recent free trade agreement  among the Baltics
trade will be with non-former  Soviet Union countries.  allows countries to maintain  independent  external  trade
Initial exports  are  likely to be labor- and  resource-  policies, without  creating the many administrative
intensive goods, because it is easier to adjust to Western  problems  of a union.  Free trade agreements will not only
standards with those  goods. Eut in the  long run, the  improve  market access but may help lock in reforms at
Baltics will have a comnparative advantage in skill-  lome,  vhich  may help attract  foreign investment. With
intensive  manufactures,  as their  years of schooling are  liberalized trade,  competition  from  liberal Estonia  may
among  the highest in the  developing world.  (Exports  of  help reduce protection  levels in Latvia and Lithuania.
labor- and resource-intensive  products,  especially from  After initial adjustment,  trade with  the West will
Estonia, have already  increased.  Estonia is the most  promote  faster, more sustainable growth. Allocation  of
advanced  of the Baltics in its transition  to a market  resources based on world  prices, and  transfer of
economy.)  technology, will increase productivity  growth. Trade
Sorsa predicts the Baltics will eventually trade  mosdy  with the West will probably also lower environmental
with Europe.  costs.
She says the Baltics are unlikely to benefit from deeper  OECD  protectionism  is unlikely to become an
trade  integration  with the  East because:  insunnountable  obstacle to more Baltic exports  to the
- The lower adjustment  costs and the benefits of  West. Recent statements  about Europe  turning  its back
maintaining  viable industries resulting  from sustained  on the reforming East seem exaggerated,  at least for the
trade  flows with the East are likely to be outweighed  by  Baltics. Their position  as the former  Soviet Union
the  cost of lost opportunities  in the West.  member most discriminated  against by Europe  is
* Temporary  preferential  arrangements  entail  high  changing, as they rapidly climb the various pyramids  of
administrative  costs and are  rarely temporary.  access to European  trade.
* Preferential  trade  could mean slower adjustment
and powerful  lobbies against change.
This paper - a product of the International Tradc Division, International Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in
the department to monitor and advise  on the trade policies of transitional economies. Copies of the paper are available free from
the World Bank, t81 8 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please  contact Jennifer Ngaine, room R2-052, exrension 37947
(48 pages). December 1994.
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authors' own and should not  be attributed to the World Bank. its Exective  Board of Directors or any of its mrenber countrie
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Summary
Benefits from either deeper Eastem integration on either a temporary or permanent basis
are  doubtful  for the  Baltics. Deeper integration with the  East has been proposed to  help
adjustment by maintaining existing trade flows, or because of difficulties in market access in the
West. This paper will argue that the Baltics should rather continue to make efforts for closer
integration with the West in their emerging trade relations, and that market access is unlikely
to be a serious problem. Given the preferential structure of market conditions in Europe, free
trade agreements are also a key to better market access.
Geography and existing factor endowments predict that the Baltics would trade mostly
with Europe and have a comparative advantage in skill intensive manufactures. According to a
gravity model over 90% of the Baltics' trade would be with non-FSU countries. Initial exports
are likely to be labor- and resource-intensive goods, because of easier adjustment to Western
standards in these goods. In the longer run, the Baltics are likely to specialize in skill-intensive
manufactures - their skil  levels measured by years of schooling are among the highest in the
developing world.
Trade relations with the East are best pursued in the context of multilateral trade rules
and pursuing unilateral liberalization at home.  Benefits from deeper Eastern integration within
a  temporary  or  permanent  preferential  trading  area  are  therefore  doubtful.  First,  lower
adjustnent costs, and maintenance of potentially viable industries that could results from the
maintenance of existing trade flows with the East are likely to be outweighed by the cost of lost
opportunities in the West. Trade policy is second best as social policy - safety nets are likely to
target assistance in a more efficient way. Second,  temporary preferential arrangements also carry
high administrative  costs and their temporariness  can be doubtful. Third, preferential trade could
also mean slower adjustment and create powerful lobbies against change.
Fourth,  trade with the East is currently beset with numerous non-tariff barriers,  that
impede trade beyond preferential access reducing potentidal  for trade maintenance. Slow and
unreliable  payments  arrangements,  unstable  currencies  and  barter  arrangements  increase
transaction cost  and impede trade creation. These underline the importance of tackling these
issues first.  Fifth,  a  preferential trading  area with much larger partners such as  Russia or
Ukraine could exogenize protection for the Baltics in a negative direction and bring a risk of
increasing external protection for the  relative liberal Baltics. This risk is magnified by  the
present different speeds of adjustment between the faster reforming Baltics and slower Russia
and other FSU republics.
The recently agreed free trade agreement among the Baltics can help trade liberalization
among them. A free trade agreement allows countries to maintain independent external trade
policies,  which avoids many of the administrative problems of  a union. Trade diversion is
reduced by the existing free trade agreements with Europe and continued unilateral liberalization
at home. It could also help create intra-Baltic trade in production to Europe. Competition from
the liberal Estonia can also reduce protection levels in Latvia and Lithuania.(ii}
Trade  with  the  West  beyond the  initial adjustment will promote  faster  and  more
sustainable growth.  Allocation of  resources  according to  world  prices,  and  transfer  of
technology will increase productivity  growth.  Trade with the West is also likely to mean lower
environmental costs.  In Europe, given the pyramid of preferences, free trade agreements are
iumportant  for market access.  Given the structural and economic characteristics of the Baltics
al:  Western Europe trade creation is likely to exceed trade diversion.  The FTA also brings
security to market access and helps to lock in reiLorms  at home, which in turn may help attract
foreign investments.
OECD protectionism is unlikely to become an insurmountable  obstacle to more exports
to the West from the Baltics. The fears expressed in a number of statements and recent studies
of Europe tmning its back to the reforming East seem exaggerated, at least for the Baltics. Their
position as most discriminated FSU members is rapidly changing as they climb the various
pyramids of market access in Europe. Access to most EFTA markets has substantially  improved
with the recent free trade agreements. The Baltics have been quick to take advantage of these
opporunities.  Exports of labor- and resource-intensive  products have increased especially from
Estonia. Estonia is also most advanced of the Baltics in transition to a market economy. In the
European Union the Baltics are still among the most discriminated non-OECD countries, but
better conditions are under negotiation.1. Introduction
Is regional integration a viable option for the Baltics in their trade relations with each
other and third countries? The role of regional trading arrangements in transition or in the long
run  in  the  former  centrally planned economies has  been  subject to  differing views.  A
preferential trading area  with the  East'  and among the  Baltics during transition  has been
proposed to ease adjustrnent by maintaining existing trade  flows for industries with positive
value-added at world prices (Tarr-Michalopoulos (1992b), van Brabant (1993),  ECE  1990,
1992).  Permanent integration with the East has been proposed (Ethier (1992) and ECE (1992))
to create efficient trade flows among "natural trading" partners. Doubts about market access in
the West has also been used as argument for deeper integration among the countries in transition
(Messerlin 1993).  In practice the Battics have ignored these arguments and have made more
efforts to integrate with the West than with the East 2. Despite higher initial adjustment costs,
integration with  the  West  is  likely  to  bring  substantial benefits from  increased exports,
investment, transfer of technology, and spill-overs from exposure to modem laws and ways of
doing business.
This paper will discuss three options for regional integration in the Baltics - with the
East,  among the Baltics and with the West. Although trade with the East is  important, the
benefits for  the  Baltics  from  deeper  integration with  the  East  even  within a  temporary
preferential trading area are doubtful.  Free trade among the Baltics can complement Western
integration.  This paper will argue that the Baltics should continue to make efforts for deeper
integration with the West.  The paper will also show that regional trade arrangements are
important for better market access in Europe, and that so far market access has not been a major
obstacle for trading with the West.
'The paper uses East for Former Soviet  republics, and West for the rest of the world. Former CMEA countries
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland, and Rumania)  are included  in the West, as their trade with the Baltics
during the Soviet period was minimal.
2 At the time of writing the Baltics have entered into free trade agreements  with a number of EFTA countries
and with each other and have agreed on a gradual move to free trade with the European Union (EU) as of 1995.
General trade agreements exist with some FSU countries.2
The paper will first discuss the likely determinai.ts of short and long-term trade flows
and comparative advantage of the Baltics. Likely net benefits from trade creation and trade
diversion with each option of regional integration are then analyzed on the basis of indicators
and conditions developed by theory and past studies on regional integration. These indicators are
existing and expected levels of protection, complementarity  of demand, differences in economic
structures and factor endowments.  In addition, administrative  and political economy concerns
influence the costs and benefits from regional integration.
2. Comparative  advantage
How will the Baltics fit to the world trade scene? What would be the direction and
strueture of their trade in view of their geographic location and factor endowments? The short
run is likely to differ from the long run.
i) The Short run
Initially, trade patterns with the West are likely to i) reflect past patterns of production
and trade, and  ii) the ease of adjustrnent in
different  industries  to  world  prices  and
Box 1. Trade distortions  in central  plmaing - timber
conditions. Resource-based goods or  simple
A good exampleiof  disoned tade pamerns  from central pbnning
labor-intensive  goods  are  the  most  likely  is the wood  and paper sector  in Estonia. Soviet  planners assigned
two paper mills to Estonia. Thesc used imported.fir and pine
candidates for initial exports.  Adjustment to  from Russia as raw  materials for the paper Estonia  exporled  to
other FSU republics. Estonia  had plenty of local wood - bich -
world  prices  and  standards  in  heavy  or  which was exported as logs. Since independence  the factories
suffer from the rut-off of timber supplies from Russia. which
capital-intensive  industries  can  be  more  have  been  declared  sfrategic.  Exisdng  techmology  is unsuitable
for local  birch,  which  is unformoate  as  birch  provides  z higher
difficcult and  bear  the  highest  adjustment  lual4 paper  than  p  and  fir.
costs.  Efficient production of many products
may require new investments to match differences in local and world standards, and to replace
outdated, wasteful technologies.  In resource-based goods the switch between markets is likely
to be easier as they tend to be more standardized, and quality can be less important in sales.
Initially incentives for  continued trade  with  the East  are highest  in  machinery for
differences in standards with the West and undervaluation in pre-independence  trade. Highest3
incentives for Eastern trade are  in the most undervalued goods - energy and raw materials
(World Bank 1992a). The opposite is true for consumer goods, food and agricultural products,
which were overvalued. But gradually the incentives change as trade with the East will also
change as relative prices adjust to clnnges in prices and exchange rates.
The Baltics emerged from the Soviet era with highly distorted production and trade
patterns.  Trade within the Soviet bloc was based on state orders at pre-determined prices
commonly ignoring comparative advantages  or local resources (Box 1). At the end of the Soviet
era in  1990 over 90% of the Baltic foreign trade was within the Soviet empire. The Baltics
produced machinery, food and chemicals for export mainly from imported inputs and energy.
Trade with the outside world was minimal. The goods exported were similar to those in the
intra-republic trade - machinery and food were most important items (Table 1). Adjustment to
world prices and trade with the West is likely to be easiest in Estonia, because of the relatively
lower  share  of  capital  intensive Soviet-style industries there.  Consequently,  Latvia and
Lithuania would have the most difficult adjustment.
The emerging trade patterns in  1992/93 correspond to the  above predictions,
although the data are subject to large margins of error'.  Estonia was the most successful in
shifting the direction of its exports and had the most diversified product structure in its exports
to the West. In 1992 Estonia and Latvia exported more than half of total to the West, while
Lithuania marnged slightly above a fourth (see Table 6).  Labor-intensive goods (textiles) in
Estonia and resource-based goods (food, wood, metals) in all three Baltic countries dominated
Western exports.  Machinery exports remained important in trade  with the  East (Table 2)
especially in Latvia and Lithuania.  The better success of Estonia in turning to the West is likely
3At the end of the Soviet period  Latvia and Lithuania had the highest shares (about 30 %) of heavy industry
in total production compared to Estonia (17% ). Food and light industries  (mostly  textiles) were each about a quarter
of total industry in all three B21tic  states (World Bank 1992a).
4Hyper-inflation,  substantial  changes in  exchange  rate  and deficient  reporting from lack of border controls makes
the data for 1992 and 1993 subject to many valuation problems, and therefore should be taken as indicative only.4
Table 1: Main Exports of the Baltics in  1990
Intra-Republic  Extra-Republic
Product  %  Product  %
Estonia  Machinery  29  Food  31
Chemicals  19  Machinery  22
Light  Industry  16  Light Industry  15
Food  15  Metals  13
Machinery  40  Machinery  53
Latvia  Food  15  Food  16
Chemicals  14  Wood  7
Other (Communic.)  9  Light Jndustry  6
Machinery  44  Oil  41
Lithuania  Oil  12  Machinery  37
Light Industry  10  Food  8
Food  8  Wood  5
Source:  World Bank (1992a).
Table  2:  Structure  of Baltic  exports  in  1992 or  1993(%)
Estonia*)  Latvia***)  Lithuania**)
Products  West  -ast  West  East  West  East
Food  15  18  9  20  34  15
Wood  14  6  18  1  2  2
Textiles  24  11  9  16  11  21
Metals  16  2  15  3  7  3
Machinery  7  20  3  34  9  31
Other  24  43  46  26  37  28
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100
Memo:
Value Mio.US$  240  212  518  619  225  580
*) HS  Classification,  last 6 months  of  1992. **) SITC Classifiction.  ***) HS  Classification.
Source:  Estonian  Central  Bank.  COMTRADE.  State Committee  for Statistics of Latvia  (1994).5
to have been influenced  by its more rapid progress in stabilization,  more liberal trade regime and
policy reform in general (PlanEcon 1993). A large share of Latvia's exports to the West is likely
to be re-exports of petroleum and metals from other parts of the fonner  Soviet Union (!SU).
For example, Latvia has no petroleum production capacity. In Lithuania, stabilization  has taken
longer to achieve.
ii) The Long-run.
In the longer run, once property rights have been established, infrastructure improved,
and adjustments to world prices made the patterns of trade are likely to change to reflect more
closely their comparative advantages  (Box 2).
Deeper integration with the East at distorted
Box 2. Determinants  of Comparative  Advantage
prices  could  slow  this  process,  while
Tbe determinants  of the patterns  of international
integration  with the West is likely  to speed  it  trade  can  be differences  among  counies such  as in
up.'  Geography  and  relative  factor  ffactor  endowments-  or differences  in technology; specialization in  differentiated.  products  from
endowments  can give some insights  on likely  economies  of scale and imperfect.competition;.  or
:geographic  proximity.  Factor  endowments  tend to
developments  in the future.  Historical  trade  -:be-more.important.in  tradce  in more  homogencous,
or  resource-based  -products. Among  countries at-
patterns are  unlikely to  be repeated  in  the  different  levels  of incomteldevelopment  differences
future,  and  are  only  presented as  reference  in technology  can  be  t  in explaining  trade pattems.  .Trade  in differentiated  products  tend  to.  be
(Box 3).  more common among similar, higher income
countries.  Geography  as-determinant  of trade  flows
has no established  theoretical  basis, except  perhaps
benefits  from  proximity  such  as lower  transport  and
Gravity  models.  Gravity  model  communication  costs. The  short-comings  of gravity
simulations  indicate that  the  West  should  models  with,existing  theory are well-documented
(for a survey  see  Baldwin  1993).  Nevertheless,  they
tend  to fit,weU  actual  trade  patterns  and can  provide
a useful indication  of likely trade pattems in the -
absence  of reliable  trade data. They.  explain trade -.
patterns  with distance,  size and  level of GDP.
5This  is not to say  that the distorted  FSU  market  is not worth  exploiting.  This 'niche" market  is likely  to offer
much  trading  potential  during  the adjustment  period. But  the choice  of deeper  Westem  or Eastern  integration  will
effect  the speed  of this adjustment.6
absorb over 90% of Baltics exports (Table 3),h  The European  Union (EU) (dominated  by
Germany)  would absorb  nearly  half of the Baltics'  total exports. Next in line is European  Free
Trade Association  (EFTA)  with about a fourth of total trade, with Finland  and Sweden  on top
of the list. EFTA is most important  for Estonia  (26%), although  its importance  to Latvia (20%)
and Lithuania (16%) is not negligible. The EE6 (Bulgaria,  Hungary, Czech and Slovak
republics,  Poland,  Romania)  countries  share  was small  (2%). This leaves  minimal  shares  for the
Eastern partners. The share of the other Baltic  states is less than one percent, and that of the
other republics  of the FSU was 6% despite  their large physical  size. The low share is explained
by the low income levels among the Baltics  and their Eastern neighbors. The data excludes
developing  countries,  but distance  and low  incomes  are likely  to keep  their share  modest  in total.
Compared  to projected  data, actual  trade in 1992  with  the EU would  be well below  its potential,
while Russia  and other FSU were well above  the predictions  especially  in Lithuania.
Differences in endowments. Relative  factor endowments  can give some indication  on
the types of products  the Baltics  are likely to be competitive  in and who might be their main
competitors.  Most trade of the Baltics  as small, modest-income  countries  is likely to be inter-
industry  trade, in which relative  factor  endowments  are important.
The Baltics  are very  close  to the world  averages  in their relative  endowments  of all three
main factors of production  - land (N), capital (C) and labor (L) (Figure 1). Adapted  from
Anderson  (1991)  Figure 1 presents  relative  endowments  of land (proxied  as population  per unit
of arable land; (LIN) increases  from N to L in figure 1) and of capital  (proxied  as income  per
6The  simulations  used  the  Wang-Winters (1991)  coefficients,  1992  World  Bardc data  on  GDP  and
populations(Pop) and  direct  distance (Dist) between capital cities (x  and  i).  The equation is Xix=-12.5  +
0.38(GDP/Pop)x +  O.79*GDPx  + 0.22(GDP/Pop)i + 0.8GDPi - 0.75*Dist.xi in log terms.Box 3. Inter-var  period.
Most  imports and exports dozing  die intcr-war  period  were with Ibe  morc indusrializd Gemany and Unitcd Kingdom.  In late thirties
over 90% of L2rvia's and over  80% of EstniWs and Lithuania's  exporis  wet  to Wstern  Europe;.Same  applied for imports.
The agrrian  Baltic staues  devclope  to successfulaguicultlal exportcrs to the industlIzcd  Western Emurp. Despite the
cxtrn;al  constints  to tradc.  their trade pattem reflected  iner-indusmy  spcrializaton along  die lines  of casic  compa_tvc advantge.
The Balties exchanged food and. natura  resources such as wood against manufacures such as coviuier  goos-and. machinery with
Western Europe. Food (eggs and butter) was die main  export item in Lithunia and Estoai.  while-Latvia  exported mainly wood..
Geograpbic  proximity:  had a moderatc impact  on trade flows during tie inter-war period. Trade among the Badcs.or  with
tie neighboring  Russia-or  Nordic countries was-small  and eve'ndeclind during the period. Estonia  was Jmst  integratd with tbe Nonlic
countries  with the highest  shar  of trde  with them. Potendalfor trae  among  these nstly  agrarin  ecouionijes  (apart  fronm  Swen)  with
modest incomc levels  and producing smilar goods as:  tlh Balicswas  small. Communimn  cut.t  swith -their traditioal trauldi paimcr- 
.and nmed  the  FSU  ountrics  to  vcry dcosid-economies.
Table:  -W  .Bac  - Export(pr-
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Souzce:  world  Bank  (1992),  FAD  (L99Z).  UrODP  (1993)9
Table 3: Direction of Trade in a Gravity Model (
Projected Exports  Actual 1992193  Exports
Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania
EU  51  56  58  5  25  17
EFTA  26  20  16  30  9  5
-Finland  11  5  4  21  2  1
-Sweden  8  8  5  8  6  3
EEC  2  2  2  4  5  6
Other West  14  15  16  14  13  2
Balies  I  I  I  3  6  7
Russia  4  4  4  21  30  28
Odter FSU  2  2  3  11  12  33
Source: COMTRADE,  own esinmaxes.  Estonian  Misny  of Tradc, Smta Cominiune  of S
otf  Latyi (1994).
capita;  (CIL) increases  from L to C in figure  1). Both are presented  as ratios of world averages
in log scales.'  Compared  to other developing  countries,  the Baltics  would be relatively  well
endowed  with natral  resources  and labor, but have much  less capital  than the resource  poor,
industrializing  East-Asian  countries  (such  as Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  China)  for
example.  Within  Europe  the Baltics'  present  factor  endowments  put them close  to other  Eastrn
Europeans,  especially  the Visegrad  (Czech  and Slovak  republics,  Hungary  and Poland)  group.
Russia  and other FSU countries  are relatively  more abundant  in land resources.
The factor-endowment  triangle  does  not differentiate  by type of labor, which  is likely  to
be an important  determinant  of trade flows in the Baltics.  Comparisons  of relative skill and
capital  endowments  can give a better picture of the Baltics'  relative  endowments  especially  in
services and manufactures  compared  to their main competitors.  Figure 2 presents relative
endowments  of skills (measured  by years of schooling)  and per capita  income  for the Baltics,
a number  of developing  countries  likely  to compete  with  them in world  markets,  and industrial
'It  is difficult to find suitable pmxies for the factor endowments, and therefore the figure should be read as
indicative only. The land proxy, arable land, is likely to overestimate  agricultural resources at the cost of other
resources such as minerals, oil, forests etc. Also the capital proxy (GDP) may overestimate  the capital base in the
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countries. Despite possible differences in quality of schooling, years of schooling should be a
good proxy of average skills of the labor force.
The Baltics have one of the highest skill levels in the developing world (Figure 2). Their
education levels are close to  those of many industrialized countries - higher than Southern
Europe, for example. High skill levels relative to per capita income suggest that the Baltic
comparative strengths lie in skill-intensive  manufactures and services.  Their closest competitors
would be Eastern European countries - especially the Visegrad group because of similarity of
endowments. Beyond the initial adjustnent period Southern Europe or Northern Africa - other
main beneficiaries of European Union (EU) preferences in market access - should not be in
direct competition with the Baltics. Skill levels in North Africa are very low and they are likely
to keep specializing in simple labor-intensive  manufactures such as clothing much longer than
the Baltics.  Over time  as  capital accumulates the Baltics may start competing with  the
industrialing  East-Asian counties. Among the latter only Korea has comparable skill levels to
those of the Baltics. But the East Asians are a fast moving target. Russia, despite its high skill
levels,  is likely to specialize in more  resource intensive goods, because of larger relative
endowments of resources.  If other resources such as minerals, oil etc. are included the relative
advantage in resource-intensive  goods is likely to increase fiurther.  Russia could also become a
competitor in similar skill-intensive  industries.
Direction and structure of trade is also influenced by the nature of trading agreements
countries undertake. The following chapter is an overview of some of the options the Baltics
face.
3. Integration  with the East
The benefits from regional integration have traditionally been measured by the net of
trade creation over trade diversion. Past studies (for a summary see Nogues-Quintanilla  1993)
have identified conditions or  indicators that  increase the  likelihood of  welfare  increasing
integration. These can be i)  modest level of protection with third counties  (reduces trade
diversion), ii) low level of non-tariff barriers between partners (increases potential for trade12
creation),  iii)  large  existing  trade  levels  (reduces  potential  for  trade  diversion),  iv)
complementarity in demand (increases trade creation), and v) differences in economic structure
based on differences in factor enc.owments  or in income levels (increase potential for trade
creation).  The extent to which a preferential trading arrangement leaves scope for unilateral
liberalization  can also be important. Administrative  costs and the political economy of protection
may influence the choice between customs unions and free trade areas.
In economies in transition the case for preferential trading arrangements  has distinguished
between short and long terms issues (Tarr-Michalopoulos  1992a). The process of transition has
its own arguments for regional arrangements. Preferential trade may help ease adjustment costs
during transition and the survival of positive value-added industries. Benefits from temporary
preferential arrangements during tranmition  are related to shares of  "East-dependent" industry
(machinery) in pre-independence  exports, likely terms-of-wrade  losses from price adjustments,
or speeds of adjustment in the partner countries.
Below  the  economic,  administrative,  and  political  economy  arguments of  deeper
integration with the East and among the Balkics  are discussed in more detail. Past trade patterns
are too distorted to serve as basis for analysis. Trade policies in the Baltics and its trading
partners are also changing rapidly making assessment  difficult. Recent economic and trade data
in the East is patchy, but it is used to the extent possible.
3.1  Integration  with the FSU
i)  Eisfing  trade  flows
During central planning the Baltics were heavily dependent  on trade with the FSU. This
gives some weight to the trade maintenance argument. Lithuania and to some extent to Latvia
with the highest shares of machinery in exports (Table 4) would have largest incentives  to pursue
preferential twade  with the East. No information is available on the share of potentially viable
industries in this trade.13
As long as raw material or other input prices in the other FSU republics remain below
world prices (including transaction costs), and infrastructure for trading with other countries is
deficient, the Baltics may have an incentive  to imnport  from the East.  A case in point is energy.
For  example, the switching of  oil imports to non-FSU sources in Lithuania was first  made
difficult for the lack of necessary port infrastructure. The share of energy in total inter-republic
imports was highest in Lithuania (35%) compared to Latvia (24%) and Estonia (17%) (see table
4). Dependence on Eastern raw-materials  may also arise on technical grounds as standards with
the West may be different. Estimates of initial terms of trade gains (losses, table 5) for the
Baltics for maintaining trade at distorted prices show that largest "gains" would be in Lithuania
Table 4: Structure of Baltic Trade with the FSU (1990)
%  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania
Imports
Energy  17  24  35
Capital goods  39  35  33
Intermediate goods  31  31  23
Consumer  goods  - 8  7
Food  4  2  2
Exports
Energy  9  4  20
Capital goods  28  37  43
Intermediate goods  27  31  20
Consumer goods  20  20  7
Food  16  8  10
Source: World Bank (1992a). Includes intra-Baltic trade.14
most likely due to the large share of oil in its imports (35%)Y If the oil price estimate is too
low, the gains are even larger. On the other hand, if revenues from the services rendered by the
Baltics in the transit trade are included the "gains" from trade maintenance are reduced.
Many of these potential "gains" from maintaining  existing trade flows have already been
reduced by actual policy developments.  As terms of trade adjust, the incentive to trade with the
East is reduced. Russia, for example, has started to increase prices of many raw materials close
to world prices for many export products such as petroleum. On the import side the need for a
Table 5: Estimates of terms of trade  losses from price  adjustments
in intra-republic  trade  (1990)
Trade Balance in  Trade Balance in  Terms of Trade
foreign prices  domestic prices  loss
Country  (1)  (2)  (211)-i
(exports/imports)  (exports/imports)
Estonia  0.92  0.62  -32%
Latvia  1.07  0.81  -24%
Lithuania  0.89  0.58  -35%
Source: Calculated from data in World Bank (1992a).
preferential trading area for trade maintenan  is questionable, because the Baltics have low
duties for many inputs, reducing  the need for and the importance  of preferences. At the extreme,
Estonia has zero duties for most goods. Also the existence of other trade interventions reduces
the potential benefits from preferential duties.  The price incentive for Eastern trade is reduced
by the existence of export taxes in Russia and other FSU countries for many raw materials,
which raise their prices closer to world market levels.  The status of these taxes in a preferential
sThe  estimates  compare  FSU-Baltic  prices  to estimates  of world  prices  in 1990  given  1990  trade volumes.  But
the world  price estimates  used in the  table are likely  to be subject  to large margins  of error. The estimated  world
price for oil, for example  in 125  % the domestic  price. In other  sources  (Tarr-Michalopoulos  1992b)  domestic  oil
prices  in the FSU have  been quoted  as being  a tenth  of world  prices. The data  also excludes  services,  which  for
the Baltic  as transit  centers  would  improve  the  balances  (Brown-Belkdndas  1993).15
trading area is unclear.  If the taxes reflect differences in prices of internationally traded goods
and local goods, tax free trade with partners may also cause an outflow of these goods from
countries with slower price adjustments (Latvia, Lithuania, Russia) to faster reforming countries
(Estonia), or further to the West. This is already happening with food, oil and metals. If export
taxes on raw materials are maintained, they already provide special protection to transforming
industries with or without a preferential trading area. This is because the tax tends to lower the
price of the raw material domestically  below world levels. This would suggest that as a first step
trade maintenance with the East should especially address existing non-tariff barriers .
A preferential (temporary) trade agreement with the East to maintain potentially viable
industries and to reduce adjustment costs during transition also has costs. First,  a preferential
trade arrangements within a  common external tariff works  like a  (export) subsidy to these
industries prolonging adjustment to world prices. Many of the existing industries are unlikely
to be viable in the long run and their continued maintenance  will be at a cost to the economy as
the resources could be more efficiently used in other activities. In addition to higher returns,
trade with the West at world prices has positive externalities such as transfer of technology.
Trade with the East is also likely to have high environmental costs.  Subsidizing  trade with the
East to maintain old machinery and factor use is likely to continue the environmentally  wasteful
practices in energy and other input use. It could be a subsidy to pollute as well. Trading at world
prices and with modern technologies would reduce waste and pollution inherent in  the old
technologies. 9
But again this is not to say that these industries should not exist or trade with the East.
Only that maintenance of these industries within a preferential trading area with the east at
distorted prices  is  likely to  maintain the  distortions longer and  slow down  incentives for
adjustment to trade at world prices. The magnitude of the potential loss depends on the height
of the preferential margin, and on the likelihood of the industries being viable in the future.
91he pollution cost of existing production (energy  waste, use of dangerous chemicals  or other hazards) has to
be weighted against recycling costs of existing equipment  and inputs, environmental  costs of producing new inputs
or machinery, their transport costs etc.16
Without the  preferences the  selection by  market forces  would be  faster.  Low  protection
obviously would lower the efficiency costs as well.
Second, the preferential arrangement can also create powerful lobbies against change and
reform, which can undermine any temporary nature of the protection.  Too many temporary
protection arrangements have turned permanent (textiles in the West is a good example). Once
established, the preferential arrangement may be difficult to dismantle as lobbies for continued
protection would have been created.  Third,  the efficiency costs of a  temporary union are
increased, if its time-limited nature is not credible for investors. This may amount to substantial
losses in potential output.
The efficiency costs of maintenance of existing activities could be reduced by targeting
the protection to potentially viable activities. This is not recommended  as it runs great risks of
failure in picking the winners.  It would be difficult to indicate which sectors or companies to
support either with trade preferences to the East or other forms of protection. Experience with
targeted subsidies is mixed - the choice is best left to the market. It would be much better to
proceed with reform and provide the enterprises a stable macro framework and appropriate
business incentives.
The trade maintenance  argument for preferential trade with the East is also a choice on
speed of adjustment. A preferential trading area would slow down adjustment to world prices.
The above discussion suggests that the  benefits from trade maintenance with preferences are
unlikely to exceed the opport-anity  costs and risks for permanent protection. This would depend
on how the preferential area would function.  A small preference within a free trade area is
obviously less  harmful than a  highly protectionist common external duty for  the presently
relatively liberal Baltics. Obviously, if the option is unemployment, the costs of maintaining
labor in the "old" inviable industries is lower.  But using trade policy for social policy may not
be most efficient and a better option would be to give direct assistance to affected workers.
ii) Complementarity  in demand
Past trade patterns suggest some complementarity or excess demand between the more17
industrialized Baltics and the more resource-intensive  other republics of the FSU.  Whether the
complementarity will hold in the future remains to be seen. Past trade patterns are unlikely to
reflect true comparative advantages of the former centrally planned economies. Existing factor
endowments imply limited complementarity  in the future.  Similarity of skill levels between the
Baltics and the larger FSU countries suggest some similarities (figure 2). On the other hand, the
larger endowments  of resources in general in tde other FSU can lead to different specializations
between them and the Baltics in the future.
Beyond trade in goods the Baltics had important links with other FSU republics in the
services sector. Their geographic location is likely to maintain  some complementarities  vis-a-vis
other FSU countries in the future. A union without border controls could make maintenance or
development of these links easier. Much of the trade between the FSU and the West transitted
through the Baltic ports with rail and road links to the Russian mainland. As Russian trade with
the West expands its own port capacity is unlikely to  suffice in  the short run.  This offers
substantial  potential for the Baltics as transit centers. The Baltics also have potential as a transit
corridor for land transportation between the large St. Petersburg  economic area, Finland and the
rest of Europe.  But these benefits are not sufficient to justify a union and can be resolved by
simplifying border and other formalities.
iii) Level of barriers
Trade creation and diversion are influenced  by the level of pre-existing trade barriers as
well as  barffers between the members in the  regional trading arrangement.  The level of
emerging external protection among the Baltics and the rest of FSU is quite different. In Russia
the average level of duties has been around 18% for preferential partners and the double for non-
preferential ones. Export taxes and other trade restrictions are numerous (World Bank 1993).
Recent problems with reform in Russia also suggest a more protectionist tr  in policies. The
Baltics have relatively moderate levels of protectionl'.
IC Unweighted  average duties in Latvia were 10% for MFN trade and 13  % for non-MFN trade (without  specific
duties), although  dispersion of rates was high (range 0-35%). In Lithuania average duties were only 3%, although
duties on many locally produced products were 10-25  % with zero rates on inputs. Both countries maintain some
export restrictions, some NTBs. Estonia has zero duties on nearly all goods.18
All Baltic  countries  have  or have  had discriminatory  policies  against  trade  with the East.
In Latvia, for example,  export  taxes  are higher  on non-convertible  currency  exports  and barter
sales than in exports in convertible  currencies. Latvia is also charging  higher import  duties
(20% compared  to 15%)  on imports  of some  products  from trading  partners that do not have
bilateral trade agreements  with it.  Until 1993  exports to non-convertible  currencies  in Latvia
and Estonia  were subject  to the value-added  tax (about 18%), which was zero rated for other
exports.
A Customs  union  between  the Baltics  and the rest of the FSU  is likely  to result in higher
protection  than at present  in the Baltics  on average.  Any common  external  duty for the liberal
Estonia would inply trade diversion. For the two other Baltics the amount of likely trade
diversion  would  depend  on how  high the external  duty  would  be set. Present  differences  in trade
policies  and bargaining  power seem  large enough  to make  negotiations  on a common  external
duty difficult.  The negotiating  power  of the three Baltic  among  the fifteen  other  republics  of the
FSU or with the much larger Russia is likely to be small. A free trade area with a more
protectionist  partner  could also lead to trade diversion.  Even a temporary  preferential  trading
area with the East within a common  external tariff is likely to result in higher levels of
protection  than the Baltic  would  maintain  independently.
Benefits  from integration  would  also be reduced  by other restrictions  on trade. Export
taxes and other  restriction  were mentioned  above.  The intra-trade  between  the Baltics  and other
FSU countries  is also beset with many non-border  barriers reducing  potential  benefits  from
preferential  trade. Payments  problems,  currency  instability,  communications,  transport  problems
hinder trade creation  that affect  maintenance  of trade flows, and still result in large shares of
barter (World  Bank 1993). Trade  preferences  would  be second  best in solving  these payments
and barter problems.  Although  the situation  has been improving  recently,  their solution  is also
likely  to take some  time, which  limits  potential  for trade creation  in the near future. Trade has
also been affected by the macro-economic  situation including  monetary  instability  and the
demand  shock  in the FSU countries.  These  reduce  potential  for trade maintenance  or creation
with or without  preferences.19
iv) Economic  structures  and speed  of reform
The differences  between  the Baltics  and the rest of the FSU in the pace of reform  and
level of development  may result in uneven  gains  and losses  from integration.  The Baltics  have
the highest per capita incomes  in the former FSU,  the fastest pace of reform and the most
success  in exporting  to the West. The latter is often  a good barometer  of success  in transition
(Table 6).  In many cases elsewhere in the world, maintenance  of a union has required a
successful  system of transfers among  members  to compensate  the less developed  ones. The
European  Community,  for example, has important  transfer mechanisms  in favor of its less
developed  but small  southern  partners.  Depending  how  the FSU  union  would  be constructed,  the
Baltics,  that are relatively  well-off  members  of the FSU, risk having  to provide  transfers  to less
developed  republics.  This can be politically  very difficult  and would be bad news for small
Baltics  supporting  big Russia,  Ukraine,  etc.
Table  6:  Economic  Indicators  of the Baltics  and some  other  FSU  Countries
GDP/capita  Agriculture  Exports  to non-FSU  as
1991  ,US$  in GDP  1991  (%)  %  of total,  1992
Estonia  3830  15  53
Lavia  3410  18  50
Lithuania  2710  30  28
Russia  3220  17  32
Belaras  3100  16  6
Ukraine  2500  24  10
Kazakhstan  2470  34  13
Source: World Ban (1992b), PlanEcon (1993).
Different  pace of reform  among  the members  of a (temporary  or pennanent)  preferential
trading area can even disrupt the process  of reform. As for example  Estonia  has now largely
liberalized  most of its prices, competition  from slower  reforming  Russia  on subsidized  goods
could undenmine  new investment  at 'world prices", especially  if export taxes in Russia  were
eliminated. The subsidies can be implicit in controlled  prices, or  in production  of  state20
enterprises  functioning  at below  marginal  cost. The existence  of export  taxes  in most other  FSU
republics suggests that substantial differences  exist in the pace of liberalization of prices.  The
extent of the gains and losses  depend  on how divergent  present  policies  are. The balancing  of
the gains and losses  might require  coordination  of other policies  such as competition  policies,
consumption  taxes, explicit  or implicit  subsidies  and liberalization  of prices, or the setting  of
safeguards  at the border. Negotiating  on all these issues  would consume  precious  time of the
governments,  which could be spent  more productively  elsewhere.
v) Administrative issues.
Preferential  trading areas always imply some institutional  arrangements,  which can
slightly  differ according  to the nature  of the preferential  arrangements.  Both in free trade areas
(origin rules) and in customs unions (sharing of revenue, customs  administration,  common
external trade policy) these can imply important  additional  costs especially  in countries  with
weak institutional  capacities. In addition, as mentioned  above both may require setting of
safeguards,  especially  if the pace of reform differs substantially  across countries,  which carry
their own risks for trade harassment. These additional  costs apply to both temporary  and
pennrnent preferential  trading  areas.
For the relatively  small  and  liberal  Baltics,  the administrative  costs  of preferential  trading
arrangements  are likely  to be higher  with a union  than with a free trade area. Agreement  on the
common external duty can be time consuming  and difficult. Revenme  constraints in other
members  can increase  pressure to raise the common  external  tariff. Distribution  of revenue
between  the Baltics  and the larger FSU partner could be difficult,  and  give rise to repeated
disagreement among the members in  the future.  Members with better ports or  other
infrastructure  (such as the Baltics)  can become  preferred ports of entry into the union at the
expense  of less developed  regions  and cause  an uneven  collection  of revenue.  If the Baltic  states
remain centers of transit trade, this problem is likely to be important. The scarce time and
energy of the governments  is likely to be better spent on other activities.21
Free trade areas would have to face the issue of origin rules. These are required to
prevent, for example, Japanese TVs, Hong Kong textiles or US bolts from entering Russia via
Estonia  free of duties. Preferential  treatnent in a free trade agreement  requires origin certificates
and only applies to goods produced in the partner countries. This tends to give protection to
producers of inputs in the partners to the agreements. in  practice this can involve complex
arrangements  for companies for accounting  of inputs and verification  systems at the border and
reduce the benefits from preferential border trade. The more different types of preferential
agreements a country has with various partners the more complex the system may become.
Origin rules can also be abused  for protection  depending  on how they are implemented.In
the absence of uniform rules, industry can easily negotiate  tailor-made rules for their purposes
and get very disguised protection. Strict origin rules can undermine preferential access to a
partner market and reduce trade creation  or trade diversion. By lobbying for tight origin rules,
a protected industry in Russia can prevent a shift in demand  to cheaper  Estonian suppliers. This
will reduce trade creation potential of a trade agreement. On the other hand, if a protected
Russian producer does not comply with origin rules, Latvian buyers may be better off getting
the same  merchandise  from third countries.  This in turn reduces  the trade diversion impact  from
the agreement. Cumulation  of origin increases  trade creating potential of free trade areas.
vi) Political economy.
The  political  economy concerns would work  against a  temporary or  permanent
preferential trading area between the Baltics and the East within a common external tariff. As
the smallest and most liberal members of the FSU, the Baltics should maintain  independence  in
external trade policies. A union with the more protectionist  large partner carries a high risk of
imposing the smaller ones to the protective structure of the large country. Preferential trade
agreements  can have both "positive  and negative" effects  on the political  economy  of protection.
If protection is endogenously determined  in a country, i.e. subject to lobbying, a preferential
trading arrangement  with several  countries  can result in lower protection  by diluting  the demand
for it. This is because lobbying  by one country becomes nore diffused,  especially  if the number
of participants  and industries is large.  But a union with a more protectionist  and large partner22
may also exogenize protection in the negative direction, i.e. adjust it according to the lobbies
of  the larger countries. With a  free trade agreement a country is free to  set its external
protection, but this affects only trade with non-partners. If a large share of trade is covered by
the free trade agreement, the impact of increased  border protection is small.
Membership in an Eastern preferential area may also influence conditions of market
access in the West. The West may be more cautious vis-a-vis preferential access for individual
members of a customs  union. Depending  on the depth of integration within the potential Eastern
union in which the member interested in preferences (a Baltic country) belongs, free access in
the West to this one member could lead to free access to the whole union (FSU). The partners,
the West and the Eastern  union member (the Baltic country), would have to reach agreement on
how to establish "member" (Baltic)  origin from FSU origin, which can be difficult if the Eastern
union has free internal movement of goods. Eastem partners may also be required to agree to
the additional preferential trade partner in the West for one member. Depending on how deep
the integration within the union should be, potential  FTAs with the West would also have to be
negotiated with the preferential union and not with the Baltic republics."' The presence of
Russia or  other FSU republics with slower reform carries the  risk that the terms of these
agreements  could be much harder than for the Baltic alone. As small countries, the Baltics cause
less fears for trade disruption.
In summary, many  economic  factors  point against  deeper integration  with the East. Trade
diversion is likely  to outweigh  trade creation. The two regions are unlikely  to be complementary
in demand due to  similar factor endowments, and deeper integration is likely to  result  in
increased overall protection in the Baltics. Benefits from temporary preferences are likely to be
outweighed by lost opportunities  elsewhere in the economy, existing non-tff  and non-border
barriers in intra-trade, differences in the pace of reform, high administrative  costs and the risk
of creating lobbies against change.  The exact balance depends on what type of integration is
"In Latin  America  members  of loose  Customs  unions  such as the Andean  pact  have  negotiated  separate  free
trade  agreements  with  other  countries.  But  this  requires  that  origin  should  be established.  Presence  of borders  again
reduces  the benefits  from  union.23
sought. The range from simple duty preferences to border-less free trade  is wide. The case
against a integration is strongest for Estonia with least dependence  on the FSU, the most liberal
policies, the most advanced reform process and a head start in trade with the West. 12 Lithuania
is the opposite case. But this does not mean that the Baltics should turn away from trade with
the East - only that a priori there seems little benefit in subsidizing this trade.  Security of
market access and liberalization of partner policies can be pursued in the multilateral setting in
the  GATT.  It  also  makes sense to  tiot  remove  existing non-tariff barriers  to  intra-trade
unilaterally before considering  preferential trade arrangements.
3.2  Intra-Baltic Integration
i) Existing trade flows
The need for a temporary preferential trading area or a union  among the Baltics to
maintain existing trade  flows is  minor, because there  was little genuine trade-dependence
between the Baltic countries during the Soviet years.  In early  1990s intra-trade accounted
between 7-13  % of their exports.  Most of the intra-Baltic trade was in energy products, and -
even after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the coming into force of the Baltic free trade
agreement - continued to take place duty-free. The Soviet planners attnbuted important roles for
the Baltics in their centralized energy planning with large excess capacity at national levels in
Lithuania  and  Estonia. The  bulk  of  Estonia's  exports to  Latvia (75%)  and imports from
Lithuania (58%) in  1992 was energy. Lithuania's main export to Latvia was petroleum (40%)
(Annex Table 1).  Much of this trade is likely to continue along the lines of existing pipelines
and distribution networks with or without a preferential trading  area as long as Baltic prices
remain competitive vis-a-vis outside suppliers and other distribution networks do not exist.
ii) Complementarity  of demand and structural  indicators
Trade creation in a Baltic preferential trading area is likely to be limited by the relatively
similar nature of factor endowments in the three countries and the small size of their markets.
A union with similar countries can be beneficial, if there is a large potential for intra-industry
12Sw  PlanEcon (1993).24
trade in differentiated  products or with economies  of scale. This is less likely to be the case with
the labor-, skill- and resource-intensive  products, in which the Baltic countries  are likely to have
some comparative advantage (Figures 1 and 2). Clothing, textiles, footwear or wood products
such as furniture have limited scale advantages. Competition  in many of these products is often
based on flexible production structures and small series of rapidly changing products favoring
small production units.  This limnits  the potential to create future comparative advantages with
scale economies within a Baltic customs union. The small size of the potential internal Baltic
market limits gains from trade creation within a Baltic  union. The Baltics have 8 million people
at relatively modest incomes. This makes thiem  roughly the size of Sweden in population, but
at 10% of its GDP.
Trade in energy among  the Baltics again is a special case. Economies  of scale in this area
can bring large benefits for the three small Baltic  countries. Collaboration  in developing  common
energy infrastructure, strategic self-sufficiency  or  rehabilitation or  restructuring of  existing
facilities can  be very  beneficial for the  Baltics. Most of  this can be  achieved without a
preferential trading area.
iii) Level of protection
The differences in trade policies in the Baltics, although smaller than between them and
the rest of FSU,  are likely to make negotiations on a common external duty difficult. Any
external duty for the liberal Estonia with practically  zero duties would imply trade diversion. For
Latvia and Lithuania free trade with Estonia could be trade creating.  But it is doubtful that
Estonia's Baltic partners would agree to a low and uniform  common  external tariff, which would
be in the interest of Estonia.  On the other hand, any compromise for Latvia and Lithuania
would mean lowering of their duties and be trade creative. Transparency  to the process of setting
the duties could also improve in these  two countries. A free trade area with independent  external
trade policies would be more workable for the three countries. Binding of policies in GATT
could increase transparency  of domestic  policies.
iv) Pace of reform
Despite the relative similarities  of the Baltic economies, the present differences in pace25
of reform are sufficient to give rise to uneven distribution of gains and losses within a union.
Among the Baltics, Estonia is the most developed of the three Baltic states with highest incomes
and largest share of industry in output and fastest pace of reform (Table 7) making it a likely
gainer within the Baltic union. Latvia is close to Estonia in its success of exporting to the West
and share of industry in total output. Lithuania has had the slowest pace of reform and least
success in turning to the West, although  it is catching up. Estonia with its more open economy,
convertible currency and stabilized economy might attract most new investments and  take
markets from the two other partners. A protected industry in Lithuania might lose to  a more
efficient Estonian industry within a moderately protected union. Transfer payments between
Estonia and Lithuania seem politically unthinkable. The uneven distribution of gains could in
time bring unnecessary  friction among the members. A free trade area - already in place - should
avoid many of these problems.
v) Adminirative  issues.
Many of the administrative issues discussed with the FSU union apply to the Baltics as
well. Agreement on common rules for the distribution of customs revenue within a Baltic union
could be difficult.  The Baltic countries  have different revenue constraints. In  Latvia and
especially in Lithuania, pressures to raise revenue at the border are higher than in Estonia.
Lithuania has stated an explicit target of collecting at least 10% of revenue from import duties.
In the more liberal Estonia, at least in the past, revenue concerns have not influenced the level
of duties, which have been kept almost to zero.
The nature of origin rules in existing Westem FTAs favor an intra-Baltic free trade area.
These allow the Baltic countries to cumulate origin among themselves in their exports to the
Nordic partners. This may also become a rule with the EU, when the Europe Agreements are
negotiated with the European Community. Cumulation  of origin can contribute to trade creation
by fostering intra-Baltic trade links in many intermediate- and input-producing  industries. This
is facilitated, if intra-Baltic trade is free of duties. If, for example, a Latvian manufactarer of
textiles has to pay a 15% duty on cloth from Lithuania (the case without a Baltic free trade
area), its incentive to cumulate inputs (purchase inputs in other Baltic countries) for duty free26
sales to Sweden  can be destroyed. This can be corrected  with a duty-drawback  scheme in Latvia,
but probably at much higher administrative  costs than a duty-free regime.  With no duties, this
problem does not arise for Estonia.
vi) Political economy.
Most political  economy  considerations  favor a free trade area compared to customs  union
among the Baltics. A union among the Baltics might diffuse protectionist pressures in the less
liberal partners,  i.e  in Latvia and Lithuania, by making local lobbying more difficult. For
Estonia there is a big risk that the external protection would increase in a union. A free trade
area among the Baltics in which one member is very liberal (Estonia) could reduce the power
of the lobbies of the inefficient  industries in Latvia and Lithuania as they lose markets to more
efficient ones.  This  could contribute to  overall reduction in  protection there. In  all  three
countries the  risk  of  abusing emergency protection measures remams, in  which case the
endogenous nature of the protection would work against efficiency.
The above suggests that, although  a preferential trading area among the Baltics seems ill
advised, the free trade area that the Baltics have now agreed upon can be a good option for
them. The benefits are clearer for Latvia and Lithuania than for Estonia. An FTA can provide
some trade creation among the Baltics as preferential suppliers to each other and can put them
on equal footing with the Nordic countries with free trade agreements. Trade diversion will be
limited as long as the Baltics maintain a low level of protection.  A free trade area avoids many
of  the  administrative problems of  customs unions - revenue sharing and  worries  about
distribution of gains and losses within the union. The unfair trade problems raised by  the
differences in  the  pace  of  reform could be solved by  appropriate safeguard rules in  the
agreements. The Baltic countries  can also cooperate  in many other areas such as infastructure,
designing of regulations and laws, etc. Baltic cooperation in building roads, communications
links, and in developing transit trade between East and West can be very beneficial, although
difficult to attain. Politically  the Baltics can form a common front in negotiations  with the West
and East.27
4.  Trade and Integration with the West
i) Compleruentarity
Many structural and economic  factors point to net benefits from deeper Western
integration  for the Baltic,.  The large  size and  high incomes  of the West  European  and the likely
complementarity  of demand  between  the Baltics  and most  West European  countries  offer large
potentia!  for trade creation.  The  differences  in skill/capital  endowments  between  the Baltics  and
most European  countries  in figure  2 are substantial.  Deeper  Western  integration  also offers
substantial  institutional  and dynamic  benefits  for the Baltics.  Integration  with a m,ore  developed
partner will expose  the less developed  partner to modem laws and regulations,  and can help
transfer  of technology.  It may also  help lock in reforms  at home  as a large  share  of imports  has
contractal limits to protection.  Free trade agreements  provide  for larger security  of market
access  than preferences  given  in the framework  of the Generalized  System  of Preferences  (GSP)
or other  unilateral  schemes,  which  can  be essential  to attract  foreign  investment.  The investors
in turn can serve  as a shield  against  emergency  protection  in the partner  country.
ii) Level  of protection
Efficiency  costs from  preferential  trade with  Europe  are likely  to be modest  because  of
the relatively moderate average level of protection in most European countries (outside
agriculture). As long as the Baltics continue  with unilateral  liberalization,  the potential  for trade
diversion  should  be limited.  This  underlines  the importance  of  unilateral  liberalization  before  and
after free trade agreements. Integration  with the presence  of trade barriers will, however,
always  imply  some  trade diversion from more  efficient  sources  of supply,  which  has to be
weighed  against  the benefits.  Customs  revenue  will also  be lower.  These  costs are likely  to be
lowest  for Estonia  with no duties.
In Europe, integration  in many cases is a pre-condition  for better market access  and
against  discrimination  vis-a-vis  main competitors.  Market  access  is differentiated  by various
preferential  agreements  lowering  both tariff and non-tariff  barriers for exporters within a
pyramid  of preferential  access  (For more  details  see Pobl-Sorsa  1992).  For example,  in textiles
the MFA is not applied  to free trade partners,  although  some  of these  are subject  to other but28
less onerous restrictions. Market access in a number of sensitive  goods is also more restricted.
As the Baltics are  initially likely to  have some comparative advantages in sectors such as
clothing, footwear and steel, preferential  access can be important  for export development.  For
example, Estonia with its zero-duty policies is nearly a text-book case of a free trader, but its
export development  depends largely on conditions  of market access in the West. Without a free
trade agreement with Finland, for example, it would face duties of 30-35% in many clothing
items, which are one of its main exports.
Box 4. The restrictive impact of origin rules in bilateral free trade agreements
Origin rules can limit Baltic export potential to their Nordic partners. They favor
resource-based products, but discrininate against specialization according to  stages of
production. To get duty free treatment for a garment in the Swedish market, for example,
under the FTA the cloth would have to be of Baltic or Swedish  origin, and the final product
sold only in Sweden. This tends to give protection to producers of inputs in the two partner
countries. If the Swedish fimal  product is exported to  other EFTA or EU countries the
Swedish exporter would have to pay the duty on the part of the product that was imported
from the Baltics. The agreements also require separate accounting of inputs according to
origin or sales according to destination, which increases costs to producers. If duties are
low, the preferential margin is eroded by administrative  costs. EFTA estimates show that
extra costs imposed by complying  with the rules of origin can be up to 2  % of the value of
exports (Herin 1986).
iii) Administrative  and political economy concerns
Trade creation from deeper integration can be reduced by origin rules or by  various
forms of emergency protection in the partner countries (Box  4).  Evidence on the restrictiveness
of origin rules in the existing Baltic-EFTA  agreements is mixed. For example, Finnish customs
has not required origin certificates for the first nine months of the agreement between Finland
and the Baltic states. Interviews with Estonian  producers suggest that, especially in textiles, the
local content requirement from the origin rules are very strict, and that they have difficulties in
complying  with them. These are areas in which future discussions  of the agreements should pay
careful attention. In the European Union the application of Anti-dumping  duties against the
Baltics  will remain subject to more stringent  rules as former communist  countries, until they sign
Europe types of agreements. Until mid 1994 only Estonia among  the Baltics had faced one anti-
dumping action in the EU.29
The success of Western integration will largely depend on the willingness of the West
to open their markets to the Baltics. In the following  the importance  of this potential constraint
is  discussed in more detail.
5. Conditions of Market Access in Main Western Markets for the Baltics.
Is the West willing to welcorne  the Baltics?  Are the conditions offered such that deeper
integration becomes possible? A recent paper by Kaminski-Yeats  (1993) argues that the FSU
countries in general have been among the least preferred suppliers in many OECD countries.
The Baltics have done better than other FSU countries, but are still well below their most likely
competitors  - the reforming  East European  countries.  The situation  is changing  rapidly, however.
Access to main West European markets - EFTA and EU - is discussed in more detail below.
Market access is also only one determinant  of export performance. Even  with most open markets
inefficient producers are unlikely to succeed, which underlines the importance of  domestic
policies. Trade can also be influenced by other structural or natural factors such as natural
resources or past structure of industry.
i)  EFTA Markets.
Geographic proximity and high income levels make the Nordics important potential
trading  partneis  for  the  Baltics  and  most EFTA  countries have given  them  substantial
concessions in market access. Bilateral  free trade agreements  have been in force since mid 1992
between the Baltics and Finland,  Sweden and Norway. For  Finland the agreement was a
continuation  of the duty free access granted previously to the republics of the Soviet Union.
Agreement with Switzerland entered into force in April 1993. Austria, the remaining large
EFTA member, has granted the Baltics GSP  treatment.  The bilateral  agreements  provide for duty
free access for industrial products' 3 subject to origin rules.' 4 Agricultural products and fish
(Sweden and Norway) are subject to separate agreements.
"3The  definition  of industrial  products in the agreements (HS chapters  25-97) is much wider than the traditional
definition of manufactures  in international  trade statistics.  The definition  includes  petroleum, many iron and steel
products.
"'Origin rules require that 1) a product is wholly  obtained in the free trade area, 2) the tariff heading in the
Harmonized  System for the finished  product must be different in the four digit level from the tariff heading for dte
third country material used; 3) a specific percentage  or processing  requirement  is met. The rules of origin as a
general  rule require substantial  transformation  to qualify  as a local product. The large number  of specific  provisions
on different products differentiates  the rules. Textiles and clothing  tend to have the tightest rules.30
The EFTA Pyraniid of Market  Access' 5 It is typical for many European countries to
differentiate  market access with trade preferences  related to either regional trade agreements or
unilateral preferences. The Baltics are just below the European Union in the EFTA "pyramid
of preferences". Other preferential agreements exist with Eastern Europe, Turkey and Israel,
which entered into force in late 1992 and 1993. After the EU, the Baltic agreements  are the most
liberal in terms of market access, and contain practically no exceptions  to duty free treatment
or phasing in periods in industrial goods.  Agreements  with the Visegrad group, Romania, and
Bulgaria, and Turkey and Israel have some initial restrictions on market access in sensitive
products and some of the benefits are phased in over a number of years. The latter are modelled
more closely to the agreements  that these have with tfie EU. Another difference  is that the Baltic
agreements are bilateral, whereas  the other EFTA agreements  (EE6, Turkey, Israel) are EFTA-
wide (except in agriculture). This makes the Baltic agreements constrained to  one country,
whereas  the  EFTA-wide  agreements allow  for  better  cumulation  of  products.6 The
restrictiveness of  the  bilateral agreements will depend on  how  strictly  origin  rules  are
implemented.
'5The  EFTA pyramid  of preferences  is of a more recent vintage  and simpler  than the EU one (see below). Until
recently, apart from the EU and EFTA free trade agreements,  the only preferential  agrement  was the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP). Finland is an exception. During the Soviet period Finland maintained free trade
agreements with most of the CMEA countries as well as with the Soviet Union. At present trade with other
successor  states of the Soviet  union is on an MFN basis. Recent  surge in free trade agreements  was partly influenced
by the need to adjust the EFTA countries  trade policies to those of the EU as part of their EU accession  procedure.
But the EFTA  countries also wanted  to get similar  treatment  as the EU in markets such  as the EE6 (Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania,  Bulgaria),  Turkey  and Israel: FTA  came in force with  Turkey on October 1, 1992;  with
Israel on January 1; 1993  with Czech  and Slovak  republics  on July 1, 1992;  Poland  on April 1. 1993;  with Rumania
on May 1, 1993; and with Bulgaria  and Hungary  in 1993.
"Cumulation  means  that use of materials  originating  in the producing  country  subject  to origin rules are allowed
in die calculation  of origin. For example, Nordic bilateral FTAs allow for cumulation  for materials  originaing in
the three Baltic countries and the Nordic  partner country. Cloth  from Latvia processed  in Estonia  will enter Sweden
duty free,  if it othierwise  fulfills the transformation  rules for origin. The EU's  Europe agreements allow for
cumulation between the partners. For example, materials from the EU, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovalda  are
cumulable for Hungarian exports to the EU. Same applies to the EFTA wide FTAs. In the EU GSP schem
cumulation  of third country  materials  is not allowed.  For example,  EU materials  do not qualify  for the determination
of origin in the Baltic.31
Other developing  countries  benefit  from national  GSP schemes.  The extent of GSP
benefits  varies among  EFTA countries.  According  to Table  7 these are relatively  limited.  In
1991,  for example,  only 15%  in Finland  or about  1% in Norway  and  21% in Sweden  of imports
from developing  countries  would  have  actually  received  GSP  benefits.
Level of protection in EFA  countries. The structure  of protection  in the EFTA
countries  makes preferences  valuable  in sensitive  sectors because  of their higher level of
protection.  Average  duties  of manufacures  in the EFTA countries  are relatively  low, ranging
between  6-9%, which  will be futher reduced  by the Uruguay  Round.  The high level  of duties
in a number  of sensitive,  labor-intensive  sectors  in the Nordic  EFTA  countries  implies  a large
preferential  margin  (Table  8) A number  of sensitive  sectors  such  as fish, textiles  and clothing,
and footwear  are in addition  subject  to a range  of non-tariff  barriers increasing  the protective
impact  of duties  on third countries  that remain  outside  the preferences.  Non-tariff  barriers,
Table 7: EFTA GSP Benefits  (1991)
Importers  Share  of Imports  from  Share  of Imports  frk  m Developing  Countries
Developing  Countries  that received  Preferences
Covered  by GSP  (%)  % of GSP  Covered  % of Total  Imports
Austria  45  100  45
Switzerland  69  71  28
Finland  26  59  15
Norway  23  64  1
Sweden  32  66  21
Source:  UNCTAD  TD/B/SCP/3
especially  in Sweden  and Norway,  affect  resource  and capital-intensive  sectors  as well (Table
8)I1.  This increases  the importance  of preferences  in market  access  especially  in products  that
'7Data  on non-tariff  barriers  should  be read  carefully.  Latest  data  available  is 1988  and the situation  may  have
changed  during  the last  five  years. As most  Nordic  countries  use MFA  restictions  on textiles  and  clothing,  and  the
data shows  very  low levels  of NTBs  in these  items,  it may not portray  very  accurately  the actual  situation.32
are likely to be of initial export interest to the Baltics.
However, the protective impact of the external duty is reduced by the existing free trade
agreements that the Nordics have with the less protected EU suppliers with a duty free access
to the EFTA markets' 8. For example, Finnish clothing producers compete not with imports
with a 30% duty plus quota rents from the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), but with EU (and
other EFTA) producers operating within their, often somewhat  lower protective margins.
Apart from fish, market access in agriculture is subject to high barriers (Annex Table 3)
with very few preferences. The Nordic countries have one of the highest protection levels in
agriculture in the world. Sweden and Norway have given few concessions to the Baltics in
agriculture. The existing agreements lower border duties for very few categories of products,
and the products remain subject to special agricultural levies.
Whle better access could improve export potential  in some products, preferential access
to the highly protected EFTA markets in agriculture at well above world prices may have high
efficiency costs. Free access to the high priced Nordic markets could draw resources to parts
of agriculture in the Baltics, which at world prices would be uncompetitive.  Any reduction in
the Nordic protection would also imply additional adjustment costs to the Baltics. A similar,
Dutch disease type, situation  has arisen in some  developing  countries  from preferences in sugar,
banmas and beef under the Lome convention  in the European Union. Preferential access to the
EU at well above world prices has attracted resources into production of the preference goods
in several developing countries. This becomes inviable once protection in the European union
is reduced. Climate in the Baltics works against many comparative advantages in agriculture.
The Uruguay Round and potential  membership  of the Nordic countries  in the EU are likely make
present high Ievels temporary. This does not mean that the Baltics shodd not negotiate better
access conditions in agriculture, but that they should be aware of the potential  costs involved.
"gAssuming  tat  importers do not mark up prices to the EFTA protection levels.33
Apart from better market access, the value of the FTAs for the Baltic lies in potential  for
foreign investnent. Nordic investors would also create a lobby against emergency  protection in
the North against the use of safeguard measures. A Nordic investor with interests in the Baltic
is likely to lobby against the use of temporary protection  in the Nordic countries against local
lobbies for protection. But substantial  amounts of investment  are unlikely to materialize  before
property rights are more clearly secured and reforms  have taken a stronger hold. The expansion
of the services sector is also best promoted by foreign investment and know-how. To take full
advantage of potential for transit trade, openness to both trade and investment  is needed.
Trade flows. Evidence  from existing trade flows suggests that preferential suppliers  are
among the main trading partners of EFTA countries (Table 9). No doubt other factors such as
geographic proximity and overall competitiveness  are equally, if not more, important. EFTA
countries traded most w.vith  their EFTA and EU free trade partners, which account for dtree-
fourths of total imports. The share of other preferential suppliers is small, which may partly
reflect the relatively recent conclusion of most other free trade agreements. The three Baltics
together accounted for less than 1% of imports in most EFTA countries in 1992. Israel and
Turkey also have low shares, less than 1% of imports in most EFTA countries. The East
Europeans were most important  in the imports of Austria (5%)  and Finland (2%) - no doubt a
result of geographic  proximity in the case of Austria, and past free trade agreements in the case
of Finland.
Actual trade performance  suggests  that the Nordic FTAs have helped market access from
the Baltics, especially in sensitive products. The uneven performance of the different Baltic
countries despite similar market access conditions also suggests that other policies also matter
for trade performance. Most exports from the Baltics in 1992 were from Estonia to Finland and
Sweden. Sweden was the main market for Latvia and Lithuania. Exports to Norway were small
(Table 3). While some of the products exported are likely to be re-exports from other parts of
the former Soviet Union (oil and metals), the Baltics managed to export other labor and34
Table 8: Level  of Tariff Protection  In the Nordic Countries  and the EU in Sensitive  Sectors
(Duties  %)  (NTBs*)
Finland  Norway  Sweden  EU  Finlind  Norway  Sweden  EU
Lnbnr-intensive
Tuxtlles(63)  19  2  10  3  0.8  1,0
Clothing(B4)  31  17  13  3  7.0  9.0
Footwcar[85)  14  7  12  6  3.0  67.8  94.8
Furniturm(82)  6  5  4  1  - -
Resource-intensive
FiHIOW3)  5  0.3  0.6  10  52.2  100.0  99,9  12.4
Wood(24+63)  2  1  1  1  - 53.9  63.2  10.5
Meals(28)  1  1  1  0  1.4  - -
Cnpitral-Inteuslv
Chemicals(S)  2  6  4  4  0.5  29.0  25.8  0.0
Machinery(7)  S  5  4  3  8.0  23.5
Imn & steel(67+68)  4  3  4  1  5  S7.2  30.9
For Memo:
Manufacturng  9  7  6  0.1  9.4  21.0  3.4
(5 to 9 less  67.68)
Source:  Smrt datbase.  Dudes arm  simple  avenges for all imports,  numbers in buckets are SITC, Rev I calegories  of products. *-Nontariff
barriers  are  percentage  of imporls  covered  by all NTBs  in 1988.
resource-intensive  products  as wefl. Clotiing  and textiles  figured  prominently  in exports  of all
three Baltic  countries  to the Nordic EFTA  members  (Table  10) - up to 20-30%  of their total
exports. Another  important  export  was wood,  especially  from  Latvia. Despite  the short  life of
the agreements  so far the data shows  that the agreements  have enabled  the Baltics  to make a
good start in exporting  to the West. This is the more remarkable  in view of the deep  recession
in the Nordic  countries  during  1992.  EFTA  consumers  are also  gainers  as the  trade displacement
is likely  to be at the cost of more  protected,  i.e. high cost, existing  EU or EFTA producers.35
Table 9: Main Preferential Sources of hniports  in EFIA  Countries (1992)
%  Share in Imports
From:  To:
Finland  Norway  Sweden  Austria  Switzerland
1.  EFTA  19  22  16  7  72
2.  EU  46  49  55  68  7
3.  Baltics  1  0  1  0  0
4.  EE6  2  1  2  5  1
Israel  0  0  0  0  0
Turkey  0  0  0  0  0
5.  All Developing  13  12  12  12  8
6.  Russia  7  2  1  1  0
Source: UN Comtrade data base.
Potential for future trade creation for the Baltics in EFTA markets can be substantial,
which increases the value of preferential access from deeper integration. As skill levels in the
Baltics  are  very  high  and  wages relatively  low,  the  Baltics  could  rapidly  replace  other
preferential suppliers such as Portugal and Greece in labor-intensive  goods in the Nordic EFTA
markets in the intermediate run.  Preferential access to the protected Nordic countries is likely
to have benefitted Southern Europe at the cost of Lower  cost developing country suppliers. For
example, Portugal holds a substantial share in clothing imports of the Nordic countries, between
12-16% of total (Annex table 2). This is likely to change once the free trade agreements with
Eastern Europe and Turkey become effective in 1993'9 and start taking hold. But differences
in skill-endowments  suggest that in the longer run both the Baltics and the Eastern Europeans
'9EFor  Finland  this only applies  to Turkey as the Eastern  Europeans  have  had a free access  in the past. Their
share of the Finnish clothing imports is also relatively  higher than those in Sweden  and Norway.36
would move to other products. Competition  from the EE6 and Turkey with the Baltics is likely
to be keener in Austria and Switzerland  than in the Nordic countries  because of geography. Even
without  FTAs, Eastern Europe has substantially  increased  exports to Austria (+87%) (Table 11).
In other EFTA countries export success of the Eastern Europeans has been below average,
except in Sweden. Turkey has increased exports everywhere.
The potential membership of the Nordic countries in the EU as of 1995 may pose some
difficulties for the maintenance of the Baltic free trade agreements. As members of the union
they in principle are obliged to adopt the EU's external trade policies. The Baltics may lose if
market  access conditions of  the  EU  are  substantially different from  the  present  EFTA
agreements.  The Baltics should use the time in interim to take maximum advantage of the
present agreements to establish trading links with their Nordic partners.
ii) The European Union
The sheer economic size of the EU and its relative geographic proximity makes it the
most attractive market for Baltic exports. However, at present the Baltics enjoy a much less
privileged access to the EU than to the EFTA markets. As part of the FSU they were first
subject to special trade restrictions aimed at communist  countries, which where more restrictive
than the simple most-favored-nation  (MFN) treatment. In 1992 the situation changed and the
Balties were granted regular MFN treatment and limited GSP benefits, which in  1993 were
extended to textiles covered by the Multifibre Agreement (MFA).  At the time of writing the
Baltics have started negotiations  with the EU for free trade agreements.
The EU pyramid of Market Access. Access to the EU market is even more fragmented
by preferences than that to the EFTA countries: i) the EU has free trade agreements with the
Nordic countries on industrial goods and soon in services; ii) unilateral preferences with the 69
Asian and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Lome Convention  include duty free access on most
industial  goods without non-tariff  barriers and substantial  preferences in agricultural goods; iii)
association agreements with six Eastern European countries (Visegrad, Bulgaria, Romania)
provide for gradual free trade in industrial  goods and some  benefits on agricultural  products; iv)
many of the twelve Mediterranean countries  have association  or free trade agreements with the37
EU providing  for duty free trade in most industrial  goods with few non-tariff  barriers and
substantial  preferences  in agricultural  goods;  and v) GSP  preferences  exist  with the  ining
developing  countries  and  most  countries  in transition.  Compared  to their  likely  main  compettors
to date, the Baltics  have been  disadvantaged  in access  to EU markets.
Level  of Protection. The overall  level of protection,  especially  in the sensitive  sectors,
is lower  in the EU than in many of the EFTA countries  (Table  8). While  this reduces  slightly
the importance  of preferences,  the larger number  of preferential  suppliers  can make them
important  for market access.  Duties  on sensitive  sectors range between  3-6%, although  these
have to be increased  by the impact  of non-tariff  barriers. Data on existing  barriers on Baltic
exports  in not available.  Table 12  gives  some  indication  on the structure  of barriers  in 1990  for
typical  GSP  (Poland)  and1  non-GSP  (Czechoslovakia)  beneficiaries.  Although  the rates  are biased
by the countries'  structre of exports,  they give  some  indication  on the differences  in protection
between  different  preferential  categories  of suppliers.
The above  table shows  that a large part of existing  Baltic  exports should  already  enter
duty-free  under  the GSP. Prior to its Europe  Agreements,  Polish  duties  as a GSP  beneficiary,
for example, were zero for many of these categories.  This can be an overestimate  as the
SMART  data  used in the table assumes  that  Poland  did not exceed  the ceiling  or quota  limits  in
the GSP. This risk is reduced  for the Baltics  as small  countries,  because  the ceilings  and quotas
in the EU tend to be insensitive  to country  size. For example,  Russia, India and Estonia  can
export  6.6 million  ECU worth  of luggage  or 15.4  million  ECU worth  of chairs  and their parts
to the Comununity  duty free annually.  However,  many  of the categories  were subject  to non-
tariff barriers.
Despite  similar duty free treatnent as the GSP, the Europe agreements  offer other
important  advantages.  Free  trade partners  are likely  to face  lower  non-tariff  barriers  in the EU,
and get a 'fairer" anti-dumping  review  as mentioned  above.  Also  coverage  of duty  free  tratment
in the sensitive  categories  in the Europe  Agreements  is likely  to be larger  than in GSP. In the
long run, all trade in industrial  goods  within  the "Europe  agreements"  should  be duty  free. The
Europe  Agreements  also  provide  for  wider  cumulation  of origin  than GSP  (see  footnote  15), and
larger  security  of markets  access  as GSP  benefits  are determined  annually.38
Table 10:  Product Structure  of Baltic Exports to the Nordic Countries (1992, % of total)
Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania
Fmland
Food  6  0  0
Textiles  20  15  31
Wood  14  61  24
Metals  36  2  1
Oil  1  5  -
Other  23  17  44
Value (mio. US$)  119.3  16.7  9.6
Sweden
Food  3  1  4
Texdles  19  10  11
Wood  18  18  24
Metals  36  4  3
Oil  7  59  54
Other  17  8  4
Value (mio. US$)  97.3  90.5  53.9
Norway
Food  1  0  0
Textiles  19  3  20
Wood  3  0  0
Metals  6  60  4
Oil  56  10  60
Other  15  27  16
Value (mio. US$)  8.1  10.5  2.9
Source: UN Comtrade data from importer data.  The categories in SITC terms are
Food=0+  1+22+4,  Textiles=26+65+84,  Wood=24+62,  Metals=28+68+67,
Oil=3.39
Table 11: Increase in EFTA Imports from New Free Trade Partners
(percent over five years, 1992/1988  constant prices)
Exports from:  EE6  Israel  Turkey  World
Imports  by:
Finland  5  -7  48  -1
Norway  -9  -11  161  12
Sweden  25  20  10  9
Austria  87  37  59  48
Switzerland  0  43  18  16
For reference:
EU  95  22  55  39
Source: COMTRADE
Table 12: Baltic Exports to the EU in "Europe" Categories in 1992 and Level of Protection
in the EU (1990)
Level of Protection  by product categorv
Share in exports to EU (%)  Duties (%)  NTBs*
"Europe" Product  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  GSP  Non-  GSP  Non-
Categories  (Poland)  GISP  (Poland)  GSP
(Czech)  (Czech)
Al  industrial  92  95  93  0.1  7  24  24
goods
Share in ind.-
goods:  16  0  3  6.2  4.4  15  40
12  2  1  3.3  3.1  13  100
One-year  delayed  26  7  14  0  8.7  22  21
Two-year  delayed  1  2  1  0.1  5.6  57  64
Quota/five  year  7  4  4  0  10.7  89  88
ECSC  38  85  77  0.1  5.6  57  64
MFA  9  67  49
Immediate  free
trade
- of which oil
Source: Comtrade  database. Duties and NTBs based on 1990  data, Baltic export data is from EU
import data.
* NTBs are percentage  of imports  covered  by them. See footnote 18 for definitions  of the categories.40
Trade flows. The EU was a more important  market to Latvia and Lithuania  than for Estonia
in 1992 (Table 3).  This may reflect geography  or the dominance  of re-exports  in trade with the EU.
The lower market penetration  of the Baltics in the EU in sensitive  products than in the EFTA can
reflect poorer market access conditions  in the EU compared  to EFTA. Other factors influencing  this
can be unfamiliarity  of the EU market access conditions  or lack of business contacts. The share of
sensitive  labor-intensive  products  in Baltic exports to the EU in 1992 was 10% or less compared to
20-30% to the Nordic EFTA countries  (Table 13). Main exports to the EU were oil from Latvia and
Lithuania, and metals from all three counties. A large part of this is likely to be re-exports  from the
other FSU republics.
Projecting  the impact  of lower  barriers in the EU on Baltic  exports with existing  export patterns
could be misleading  and of limited  value. However,  table 12 gives  some indication  of the likely  initial
impact  of Europe-type  agreements tm on the Baltic exports.  It divides present  Baltic exports intc the
various categories according to conditions  of market access in the Europe Agreements (Kaminski
1993). Well over 90% of their exports to the EU were industrial  goods, which are covered by the
agreements.  According  to the Polish example,  duties for GSP beneficiaries  in these categories  would
ahready  be zero.
Existing trade flows suggests that Europe agreements  would be most benefLcial  for Estonia.
However, existing trade flows are unlikely  to reflect future potential. Estonia had the lowest share
(40%)  in the inmediately free category  compared  to Latvia (85%)  and Lithuania  (77%). A large share
of this in the latter two countries  was oil. Estonia also has much higher shares of its exports in the
more sensitive one-year (16%) and two-year delayed category (12%) than her Baltic neighbors.
Between 12 and 34% of Baltic exports fell into the most restricted  categories: quota/five year, coal
and steel (ECSC) and textiles  and clothing  (MFA) categories.  Steel and textiles  have relatively small
shares, which may have been influenced  by the lack of preferential access in  1992. As non-GSP
beneficiaries, the  Baltics were subject to  the high  duties on these products. The example of
Czechoslovakia  (another non-GSP  beneficiary)  shows that duties on these three categories were on
3'Mhe  Eumpe agreements  negotiated  with the Eastem  European  countries  divide  products  to be liberalized  into
six groups  with different  speeds of liberalization  for both tariffs and non-tariff  bamers. i) one-year  delayed  group
(duty-free  access in the second  year of the ETA); ii) two-year-delayed  group  (duty free access in the third year of
the FlTA);  ii) quotalfive-year  delayed  group  (gradual  increase  of quotas  and free  trade in the sixth year of the FTA);
iv) European  Coal and Steel Community  (ECSC)  group  (tariffs on steel eliminated  by the end of the fourth year,
tariffs on coal eliminated  after one year, in Germany  and Spain  on the fifth  year); v) MFA  group (quotas  gradually
increased  and eliminated  after the fifth year); and vi) immediatel free trade residual.41
average between 6-11% and a large share was subject to non-tariff barriers.  With the inclusion of
textiles to the Baltic GSP schemes in 1993, market access in these goods should have improved.
Poland, for example paid no duties on these three categories.
The above shows that market access conditions  of the Baltics to the EU are being improved.
Analysis  of the Europe agreements  compared to GSP shows that additional  benefits in terms of lower
duties would be modest, especially  for present trade flows, but are important in terms of security of
market access. The agreements  can also greatly enhance  foreign investments  and thereby form a basis
for future trade flows.  The initial success  of the Baltics in penetrating  the Nordic compared to the EU
markets in products with likely comparative advantages can partly be due to more difficult initial
access conditions in the EU, although  the situation is improving. It may also take more time to get
familiar with the GSP as a preferential system. In their negotiations  with the EU, the Baltics should
use their size to their advantage.
Market access is only one part of the equation.  Progress with reforms at home is equally if not
more important  than market access for success in exporting. Estonia is most advanced in its reforms
among the three Baltics in stabilizing  its economy and initiating  more substantial  structural reforms,
and this progress clearly shows in its initial export performance. All three Baltic republics faced
roughly equal conditions  of market access in the West, but Estonia is clearly the country that has not
only succeeded in shifting most of its exports to the West, but also has the most diversified  product
structure of these exports.
6. Condusions
Trade with the West is likely to promote faster and more sustainable  growth than maintenance
of existing trade flows with the East with preferences.  Trade with the West is likely to promote
investments and resource use closer to world prices, and is expected to improve productivity  growth
by transfer of appropriate technology.  Trade with the West is also likely to mean lower environmental
costs.  In Europe - given the pyramid of preferences - closer integration is also important for market
access, but also brings other additional  benefits. Given the structural and economic  characteristics  of42
Table 13: Share of Sensitive Goods  in the Baltic Exports to the EU
and the Nordics (1992)
%  Finland  Norway  Sweden  EU
Estonia
Labor-intensive  26  20  22  11
Resource-intensive  53  56  50  40
Capital-intensive  12  6  15  20
Other  9  18  13  29
Latvia
Labor-intensive  20  3  10  4
Resource-intensive  68  51  81  73
Capital-intensive  4  45  3  13
Other  8  1  6  10
Lithuania
Labor-intensive  35  20  11  5
Resource-intensive  24  64  62  67
Capital-intensive  4  - 10  20
Other  37  16  17  8
Source: Comtrade. Labor-intensive=Textiles (65+84), footwear (85), fiurniture  (82);
resource-intensive=wood (24+63),  fish (03), oil (3), metals (28);
capital-intensive=chemicals  (5), machinery (7), iron and steel (67+68).
the Baltics and Western Europe, trade creation is likely to exceed trade diversion in a regional trade
agreement. Integration also brings security to market access and helps to lock in reforns  at home,
which in turn may help attract foreign investments.
Gravity models predict that the West would absorb most of the Baltic exports - over 90% of
the Baltic trade would be with the non-FSU countries. Initial exports are  likely to be labor-and
resource-intensive goods, because of easier adjustment to Western standards in these goods. In the
longer run, the Baltics are likely to specialize in skill-intensive  manufactures - their skiU  levels are43
among the highest in the  developing world. Main competitors are  Eastern European reforming
countries due to similar skill levels.
Trading with the East can be important, but benefits from deeper integration with the East
within a temporary or permanent  preferential  trading area are doubtful. Benefits  from lower adjustment
costs, and saving of potentially  viable industries  through  the maintenance  of existing trade flows with
the East with temporary preferences are likely to be outweighed  by the cost of lost opportunities in
the West. The social cost of adjustment  has to be balanced against the inefficiency  cost of maintaining
inviable industries and lost opportunities  for growth.  Trade policy is second best as a social policy -
safety nets are likely to be better.  Temporary arrangements  also carry high administrative  costs, their
temporary nature can be doubtful as powerful lobbies are created against change.  The underlying
issue is largely related to the speed of transition and adjustment.
Success of trade maintenance with preferences with the East can also be undermined by
existing non-tariff-barriers.  Slow  and unreliable  payments  arrangements,  unstable currencies and  barter
arrangements increase  transaction  costs and impede  trade creation. Trade preferences would  be second
best in solving these problems. Under existing policies a preferential trading area with much larger
partners such as Russia or Ukaine  could also exogenize protection for the Baltics in a negative
direction and bring a risk of increasing  external protection for the relative liberal Baltics. This risk is
magnified  by the present different  speeds of adjustment  between  the faster reforming Baltic and slower
Russia and other FSU.
The present free trade agreement among the Baltics can promote trade liberalization  especially
in Latvia and Lithuania. A free trade area maintains  independence  in extemal trade policy and avoids
many of the administrative  problems of a union. Trade diversion  is reduced by the existing free trade
agreements with Europe and maintenance  of modest levels of protection. ft can also help create intra-
Baltic trade in production to Europe.
OECD protectionism is unlikely to become an insurmountable  obstacle to the Baltics export
development. The fears expressed is a number of statements  and recent studies of Europe turning its44
back to the reforming East seem exaggerated, at least for the Baltics. Their position as discriminated
FSU members is rapidly changing as they climb the pyramid of market access in Europe. Access to
most EFTA markets has substantially  improved  with the recent free trade agreements,  The Baltics have
been quick to take advantage  of these opportunities.  Exports of labor- and resource-intensive  products
have increased especially from Estonia. In  the  EU  the Baltics initially were  among the  most
discriminated non-OECD countries, but better conditions are under negotiation. In many products
preferences are important for better market access.45
Annex Table 1: Support to Temperate  Agriculture*
Wheat  Milk  Beef  Eggs  Pigmeat
EC  77  200  107  0  8
Finland  328  483  271  149  183
Sweden  282  307  81  138  18
United States  70  138  40  8  6
Australia  17  42  9  14  4
New Zealand  10  3  3  118  0
* percentage of producer prices above world prices in 1990.
Source: OECD
Annex Table 2: Sources of Nordic Textile hnports  in 1992 (%)
Finland  Sweden  Norway  EC
Estonia  2.3  1  <1  0
Latvia  0.3  0.3  < 1  0
Lithuania  0.2  0.1  < 1  0
Portugal  16  13  12  5
Greece  3.7  3  3  3
Thailand  2.6  2  1  2
China  10.8  12  12  5
Hong Kong  7.5  9  8  7
E. Europe  7  3  1  4
Turkey  0.9  2  1  6
EC  51.60  50  59  47
EFTA  6  6  8  3
Source: Comtrade46
Annex  Table 3: Main Products in Intra-Baltic  Trade in 1992  (%)
Exports  to:  Imports  from:
Latvia  Lithuania  Latvia  Lithuania
Estonia  a/
Electricity  75  Cotton  16  Cotton  10  Oil  58
Chemicals  8  Paper  10  Sugar  9  Paper  5
Fertilizer  2  Nuclear  react.  7  Machinery  7  Cotton  4
Shareintctal  11%  2%  2%  3%
trade
Estonia  Latvia  Estonia  Latvia
Lithuania  b/
Petroleum  40  Petroleum  40  Perfuimes  12  Textiles  17
Chemical  - 10  Gas  15  Chemicals  12  Electricity  15
Textiles  9  Elec.Machinery  7  Dye  12  Transp.equip.  10
Share  in total  2%  5%  1%  2%
trade
a  HS classification  (2 digit).
b/  SITC classification  (2 digit).
Source:  Estonian  Ministry  of Trade, Comtrade.  Data  for Latvia  not available.